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Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation
Abstract
Due to institutional investors' increasing ownership and interest in corporate governance,
we hypothesize that the presence of institutional investors is associated with certain
executive compensation structures.  We find a significantly negative relation between the
level of compensation and the concentration of institutional ownership, suggesting that
institutions serve a monitoring role in the shareholder-manager agency problem.  We
further find a significantly positive relation between the pay-for-performance sensitivity of
executive compensation and both the level and concentration of institutional ownership.
These results suggest that the institutions act as a complement rather than a substitute
to incentive compensation in mitigating the agency problem.
Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation
As their ownership of corporations has grown over the last few decades, the
monitoring role of institutional investors in corporate governance has become more
important.  One area in which this monitoring has focused is in the incentives provided
for top management through compensation contracts.  Activist institutional investors
have publicly proclaimed their interest in this area for some time. For example,
CalPERS, among other public pension funds, maintains that managerial compensation
should be tied to the performance of the firm (Colvin (1992)).  In addition, private money
managers, such as Fidelity Investments, have voiced their intent to vote against stock-
related compensation plans if they are unfair to other shareholders or do not provide
management with sufficient incentives to boost financial performance (Pulliam (1993)).
Given the increasing interest in managerial compensation by institutional
investors along with their increasing dominance in equity markets, one would expect
institutional investor presence in a firm to be associated with certain executive-
compensation structures.  The relation could develop from two sources.  The first, direct
intervention such as that practiced by activist institutions like CalPERS, occurs when the
institutional owners pressure boards of directors to limit excess compensation and to
adopt certain compensation structures such as pay for performance.  The second source
of influence is indirect and develops through institutional trading and preferences for
firms with better corporate governance characteristics.  Because of these preferences,
firms that want to attract institutional investors would adopt compensation schedules that
they believe will be appealing to the prospective institutional owners.
Two competing hypotheses exist to explain an interactive role between
institutional investors and incentive compensation in mitigating the agency problem
between managers and shareholders.  The first hypothesis considers that the presence
of institutional investors as monitors of the firm can substitute for some of the managerial
incentive compensation.  That is, given more monitoring, the firm does not have to
expend as many resources on managerial compensation.  The second hypothesis
considers the monitoring by institutional investors to be complementary to the incentive
2compensation.  That is, the monitoring by institutions works in concert with managerial
compensation to mitigate the agency problem.
In this paper, we test for a relation between executive compensation and
institutional investor influence and whether such a relation is due to a substitution or
complementary effect.  We measure direct institutional influence by the concentration of
institutional ownership in a firm and indirect influence by the level of aggregate
institutional ownership.  We find strong evidence of a relation between each of these
measures of institutional influence and both the level and performance-sensitivity of
executive compensation.  Most important, we find a negative relation between
institutional concentration and level of executive compensation and a positive relation
between both measures of institutional influence and the pay-for-performance sensitivity
of managerial compensation.   The latter result suggests that institutional investors act
as a complement rather than a substitute for incentive compensation.
Our study differs from earlier studies on managerial compensation in that we
examine the interaction between compensation structure and one particular type of
corporate governance control that has not been previously studied with regard to
managerial compensation – the presence and concentration of institutional investors.  In
addition, we examine pay-for-performance of the entire top management team as well as
that of the CEO.  Much of the prior research has restricted its focus to CEOs.
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we discuss the
importance of incentive compensation for managers and the role of institutional investors
as monitors of management.  We also develop our two competing hypotheses regarding
the effects of institutional investor influence on managerial compensation.  After
describing the data in Section II, we test the relation between institutional influence and
the measures of compensation in Section III.  We provide our conclusions in the final
section.
3I.  Managerial Incentive Compensation and Institutional Investor Monitoring
An agency problem exists between a firm’s shareholders and its management because
they do not have the same goals and preferences; managers have the natural incentive
to make decisions in their own best interests rather than those of the shareholders.  As
pointed out by Fama and Jensen (1983), the shareholder-manager agency problem can
be mitigated through a number of different monitoring mechanisms, such as the stock
market, institutional investors, large blockholders, board of directors, labor, lenders, the
legal and regulatory environment, and the effects of the informational and competitive
environment.  An additional mechanism (chosen by the board of directors) derives from
the incentive compensation of managers.
We focus on the interrelation between two of the potential monitoring
mechanisms, managerial incentive compensation and institutional investors.  It should
be recognized, however, that the other mechanisms also likely influence this
interrelation.  For example, the legal and regulatory environment imposes constraints not
only on the actions of the institutional investors, but also on the form and level of
executive compensation.
A number of studies examine the consequences of incentive compensation in an
agency relationship.  Principals, such as the shareholders of a corporation, have a
variety of potential methods of compensating their agents, the managers.  For example,
in addition to straight wages or deferred payments, compensation can depend on the
manager’s performance through the use of bonus pay, stock grants, or option grants.
Such compensation is consistent with theoretical arguments, e.g., Holmstrom (1979) and
Shavell (1979), which show that in the presence of moral hazard problems, optimal
payoffs to the agent are contingent on performance.  The relation of compensation to
firm performance (the pay-for-performance sensitivity of compensation) has also been
documented by a substantial body of empirical work.1  Beyond the slope of the
performance sensitivity of managerial pay, studies have also examined how managerial
                                               
1 See Murphy (1998) for an extensive review of this literature.
4decisions can be influenced through the convexity of that pay to performance (e.g.,
Smith and Stulz (1985), Guay (1999)).
Because of the potential complexity of executive compensation and its effects on
managerial decisions, studies have shown that the components of the compensation
contract can have diverse effects, depending on the risk aversion and/or wealth of the
manager (Carpenter (1999), Ross (1999)).   Given these diverse potential effects, one
would not expect incentive compensation to be the sole mechanism for mitigating
agency problems between managers and shareholders, implying that other mechanisms
- such as monitoring by institutional investors - would also be needed.
I.A.  Institutional investors as monitors
Institutional investors can directly monitor firms through public or private activism.  That
is, the institution can directly let management know of their preferences and
perspectives and can put pressure on management to follow their suggestions or
directives.  Alternatively, institutional monitoring can arise indirectly through institutional
preferences for firms with certain corporate governance characteristics such as better
compensation practices.  Both the direct and indirect methods of monitoring may have
effects on the compensation structures of corporate executives.
I.A.1.  Direct institutional monitoring
As noted in the introduction, private and public fund managers have voiced their
opinions that managerial compensation should be linked to corporate performance.  With
regard to the public funds, Smith (1996) documents that CalPERS shareholder
resolutions include restructuring executive compensation.  Further, in an examination of
2,042 shareholder proxy proposals over an eight-year period, Gillan and Starks (2000)
find that 233 of these proposals were specifically related to executive compensation.2
Although most of these specific compensation proposals were submitted by individual
                                               
2 Johnson and Shackell (1997) and Johnson, Porter, and Shackell (1997) investigate the
executive compensation shareholder proposals in depth.
5rather than institutional investors, the latter have focused on corporate governance
issues with indirect effects on executive compensation.  For example, Gillan and Starks
find that a major issue of institutional investors has been increased director
independence for the board, particularly on the board’s nominating and executive
compensation subcommittees.  Further evidence of the institutions’ concern about
executive compensation is reflected in the fact that an institutional investor advisory
service, Institutional Shareholder Services, lists one of their services as voting
recommendations on executive compensation shareholder proposals in a firm’s proxy
statement.
Beyond the evidence regarding public institutional investor involvement in
corporate governance issues, there are also indications of non-public institutional
influence.  For example, Useem (1996) provides anecdotal evidence concerning the
chief executive and chief counsel of a corporation meeting several times with one of their
major pension fund investors to discuss revising the corporation’s managerial
compensation structure.  Useem goes on to state, “As companies have increased the
contingency of their senior managers’ compensation, the marching orders from the
investment community have been to tighten the linkage with shareholder wealth.”
As large shareholders, institutional investors have the ability and the incentive to
be significant direct monitors of managerial actions.  Due to the high costs of monitoring
and the fact that all shareholders would benefit from the monitoring, only large
shareholders who could achieve substantial benefits have the incentive to monitor (e.g.,
Grossman and Hart (1980), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Huddart (1993)). However,
institutional investors’ ability and incentives to monitor conflict with the goal of many
institutions to maintain liquidity in their holdings.  That is, to achieve the benefits
necessary to justify the monitoring costs, institutional investors would likely forgo the
ability to quickly liquidate.  According to some authors (Coffee (1991), Bhide (1994)),
institutions are more concerned about the liquidity of their investments than building up
the concentrated ownership that would be required to have an influence on corporate
decisions.  In fact, Bhide argues that the strong liquidity of U.S. markets actually
6impedes institutional involvement in corporate governance because it is less costly for
the institutions to sell the firms that are in need of active involvement.  If liquidity costs
were higher, institutions would have a greater monitoring incentive.
Kahn and Winton (1998), Noe (1998), and Maug (1998) derive models to
consider the institutional investors’ tradeoffs between liquidity and control.  According to
Kahn and Winton, institutions must explicitly consider the tradeoff because the profits
from speculation are directly affected by the costs of monitoring (which consist of more
than the direct intervention costs).  They show that an institution’s decision on active
management depends on firm characteristics that influence whether the benefits of
increasing the value of the institution’s holdings in the firm outweigh the costs to the
trading profits.  According to Noe’s analysis, institutional investors are motivated to
monitor managers because they can gain from the monitoring, even in the presence of
free-rider problems, costly monitoring, and lacking any initial stake in the corporation.
Maug argues further that the impact of liquidity on the control of a firm can actually be
positive.  Although liquid stock markets make it easier to sell a large ownership position,
they also make it easier for investors to build up large positions in a firm and profit from
increasing their monitoring activities.
There is a difference between the monitoring incentives and abilities of
institutional investors and large blockholders that are not institutions.  Gorton and Kahl
(1999) differentiate between these two types of investors and point out that the
institutional investors provide imperfect monitoring due to their own internal agency
problems.  Because there are not sufficient individual large blockholders to provide the
better monitoring, however, the imperfect monitoring of institutional investors is still
beneficial.
It should also be recognized that even within the institutional category, the
monitoring is expected to vary due to the institutions’ diverse clienteles, preferences,
goals, and constraints.  Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) discuss the difference
between pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional shareholders and
argue that the former type of institution would be more likely to go along with
7management decisions because they have current or potential business relations with
the firm.  The authors find evidence consistent with their hypothesis – firms with greater
holdings by pressure-sensitive shareholders have more proxy votes in line with
management’s recommendations and firms with greater holdings by pressure-insensitive
shareholders experience more proxy votes against management’s recommendations.
Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (2000) provide evidence consistent with
both the Gorton and Kahl (1999) and the Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) hypotheses.
In their study of announcement effects for antitakeover amendments, Borokhovich,
Brunarski and Parrino find that the sign of the relation between the abnormal return
around the announcement and the percentage of outside blockholdings depends on the
identity of the blockholder.  When the blockholders are either individuals or pressure-
insensitive institutions (investment companies or independent investment advisers),
abnormal return and percentage blockholdings are significantly positively related.  When
the blockholders are pressure-sensitive institutions such as banks or insurance
companies, the two variables are significantly negatively related.3
Besides the size of their holdings, a further issue with regard to the presence of
institutional investors is their potential collaboration. Black (1992) submits that
institutions should be allowed to increase their monitoring power by holding larger stakes
in companies and teaming up with other institutional investors in order to be a more
important factor in corporate governance.  Holmstrom’s (1982) model of contracting
shows that large shareholders (concentration of ownership) may be needed to enact the
optimal contract with agents.4  Thus, according to Black and to Holmstrom’s
presumptions, we would expect to see better monitoring in corporations that have a
larger concentration of institutional investor ownership, ceteris paribus.
                                               
3 Borokhovich, Brunarski and Parrino (2000) use the terms affiliated and unaffiliated rather than
pressure sensitive and pressure insensitive.
4 For a review of papers with implications for owner concentration, see Allen and Winton (1995).
8I.A.2.  Indirect Institutional Monitoring
Rather than occurring through direct pressure from large or concentrated shareholdings,
monitoring by institutional investors can also occur indirectly through their preferences
and trading.  For some institutional investors, their high turnover would seem to imply
that monitoring is not a central focus of their strategies.  However, if the portfolio
managers' investment decision algorithm considers quality of management, and in turn,
executive compensation practices, then an outcome of even actively-traded managers’
decisions is that greater institutional investment will be associated with better executive
compensation practices.   Evidence on this comes from a survey of mutual fund
managers in which 58% stated that their investments are influenced by the level of CEO
pay, and 71% stated that they are favorably influenced by stock-based pay plans.
Further, about 87% indicated that they are positively influenced, at least sometimes,
when a company has a stated policy on stock ownership for top executives, 90% review
the compensation and options tables in companies' annual proxy statements, and about
49% review the letter from the Board’s Compensation Committee, which usually
describes a company's compensation philosophy and explains its compensation
programs (Maxey and ten Wolde (1998)).
Further evidence on the effects of institutional investor preferences comes from
the Gompers and Metrick (1999) study in which they argue that institutional investor
preference for large firms along with their increasing presence in equity markets has
affected relative stock prices between large and small firms.
Indirect influence arises also when institutions choose to sell their shares rather
than attempt to instigate change in the firm.  Such selling can have an ultimate impact on
the corporation's governance through several potential effects: downward price pressure
due to supply-demand effects, information signals to other investors, and changes in
shareholder composition.  The first effect is supported by empirical evidence that shows
heavy institutional selling can put downward pressure on the stock price (e.g., Brown
and Brooke (1993), Sias, Starks, and Titman (2000)).  Alternatively, information effects
that arise from institutional selling can affect the stock price, causing other investors to
9sell as well.  Finally, the type of institutional investor holding the shares may change.
This last effect may be important to directors if the type of institution holding the stock
affects share value and/or management of the company.  The directors may want to
attract a particular type of institution as shareholders, for example, institutions that have
a longer-term focus (Bushee and Noe (1999)), institutions that are more likely to vote
with management (Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988)), or institutions that provide the firm
with greater credibility (Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000)).  Hotchkiss and Strickland
(2000) find that the market reaction to a firm’s earnings announcements depends on the
composition of the institutional investors holding their shares.  Further, John and John
(1993) argue that it may be optimal for the board to consider the total effects of the
compensation structure, including the effects on other stakeholders in the firm.
Evidence on the effects of institutional selling is provided by an empirical study
by Parrino, Sias and Starks (2000).  They find that firms that fire their top executives
have a significantly greater decline in institutional ownership in the year prior to the CEO
turnover than do firms that experience voluntary CEO turnover.  These results are
consistent with the hypothesis that institutional selling influences decisions by the board
of directors - institutional selling of a stock increases the likelihood a CEO is forced from
office.5  Further, they find that the institutional selling is associated with whether the
board chooses an inside or outside replacement for the CEO. 6
I.B.  Interrelation between Institutional Investor Monitoring and Incentive Compensation
The implications of the previous theoretical and empirical research are that both
institutional investors and managerial incentive compensation serve to help control the
shareholder-manager agency problem.  As Jensen (1993) argues, diverse monitoring
mechanisms can work together in controlling corporate management.  The question is
whether the different mechanisms act as complements or substitutes.  Pound (1992)
                                               
5 As noted by the authors, these results are also consistent with the hypothesis that institutional
investors are better informed than other investors, and thus become net sellers over the period
prior to forced turnovers when these firms typically experience negative market-adjusted returns.
6 Bushee (1998) and Wahal and McConnell (1999) also provide evidence of apparent institutional
monitoring in R&D expenses and capital expenditures.
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suggests that the different mechanisms change to substitute for each other when one
mechanism, such as the takeover market, begins to wane.  Providing an example of
substitutes for incentive compensation, Hartzell (1999) shows that the threat of
termination and career concerns act as substitutes for the incentives provided by pay for
performance.
In our case, if institutional investors act as a substitute for incentive
compensation, then they provide monitoring for the firm (either directly or indirectly) that
offsets the need for assumedly costly incentive compensation.  That is, the presence of
institutional investors ameliorates the moral hazard problem between owners and
managers; consequently, there is less need to employ incentive compensation as a
quasi-monitoring device.  For example, suppose the monitoring by institutional investors
is indirect, but that they are informed investors.  The board of directors could then infer
additional information about the firm from its stock price and from institutional investor
trading behavior.
Alternatively, institutional investors could be a complementary monitoring device,
in which case their role adds to that of incentive compensation.  Holmstrom and Tirole
(1993) consider the needed interaction between stock market monitoring (in our case,
institutional investors) and managerial incentive compensation, arguing that neither
mechanism is sufficient alone to perfectly monitor managers.  Under the hypothesis that
institutional investors are complements to incentive compensation, the presumption is
that some firms have larger agency problems than do other firms.  For example, the
firms are in industries in which managers have larger potential effects on firm
performance, but the managerial actions are less observable.  In such firms, there is a
need for greater disciplinary measures which may take the form of greater monitoring by
institutions as well as greater incentive compensation.
An analysis predicting such a complementary relationship is that of Chidambaran
and John (1999), who model relationship investing in an asymmetric-information setting.
In their model, managers have information about the future value of projects that
investors do not have.  Further, managers are motivated to attend to the firm’s current
11
market value rather than its future value.  Institutional investors can help resolve this
information asymmetry, but at a cost.  Through incentive compensation that links
managerial pay to firm performance, managers would be willing to cooperate with the
institutional investors.  These factors together help mitigate the agency problems
between shareholders and managers.  The theory suggests that for sufficiently severe
agency problems, in equilibrium, institutional ownership and incentive pay tied to the
future value of the firm should be complements.7
The substitute and complement hypotheses imply differences in the sign of the
relation between institutional influence and the pay-for-performance sensitivity of
executive compensation.  Specifically, consider the case where institutions act as a
substitute monitoring device for incentive compensation.  Assuming that it is costly to
provide incentives to managers through compensation contracts, if institutions act as a
substitute, then managers of firms with more concentration of institutional ownership
should have lower pay-for-performance sensitivities, everything else equal.  In contrast,
if the institutions are a complementary device, then managers of firms with more
concentration of institutional ownership should have higher pay-for-performance
sensitivities.
II.  Data
We begin to form our sample by selecting the 1,914 firms included on the Standard &
Poor's ExecuComp database over the 1991 through 1997 time period.  The database
covers roughly 1,500 firms per year, including the 500 firms in the S&P 500 Index, the
400 firms in the S&P Midcap Index, and the 600 firms in the S&P Smallcap Index.  For
up to five top executives from each firm, we retrieve details of their compensation
package, including salary, bonus, long-term incentive plan payouts, stock and option
                                               
7 Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) also simultaneously model both monitoring by outside
equityholders and incentive compensation.  They show that for some parameter values, monetary
incentives and monitoring (through concentrated outside ownership) can coexist in the optimal
arrangement.
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grants and other compensation reported by the firms in their proxy statements.8  The
SEC changed proxy disclosure rules in 1992, requiring all firms to disclose stock option
grants to their top management.  Thus, although option grant data for firms that
voluntarily provided it is available in 1992, it is only available for all firms on the database
after 1992.
II.A.  Measures of Compensation
We employ several different measures of the structure of managerial compensation.  We
use the level of pay, where pay is alternatively defined as salary and total direct
compensation.  The latter consists of the sum of salary, bonus, option and stock grants,
long-term incentive plan payouts, and other compensation.  In addition, we use two
measures of changes in compensation in order to assess pay-for-performance
sensitivity.  Because salary is virtually fixed and consequently does not possess pay-for-
performance sensitivity, we add the bonus to the salary in order to obtain the change in
the managers’ cash compensation.  For a measure of the change in total compensation,
we add the other components of compensation, as defined above.9   Finally, we employ
a measure of particular sensitivity of pay to performance by focusing solely on the
options granted to the managers: the sensitivity of option grants to changes in stock
price.
None of these measures considers the change in compensation that managers
derive from an increase or decrease in the value of the stocks and options they already
hold.  Whether the consequence of this exclusion is an underestimation of the
managers’ true pay-for-performance sensitivity depends upon the managers’ activities
with respect to their personal portfolios.  Recent evidence suggests that these activities
may be substantial in altering the pay-for-performance sensitivity of managers’ current
holdings.  For example, Ofek and Yermack (2000) report evidence that managers alter
                                               
8 The determination of the number of executives is based on the number of executives that the
firm lists in their proxy statement.  Some firms list less than five.
9 We use several measures of compensation in the tests because of the differences across them.
In particular, total direct compensation is not simply a monotonic increase over salary plus bonus.
There is a 55% correlation between the two measures.
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their portfolios in response to the composition of their pay package.  Similarly, Bettis,
Bizjak and Lemmon (1999) provide evidence that managers counteract the effects of
existing holdings through hedging transactions.  For their sample of corporate insiders,
zero-cost collars and equity swaps cover over a third of the insiders’ equity holdings.
Given the difficulty of controlling for managers’ activities, using current
compensation has the advantage of measuring only the compensation components over
which the board of directors has direct control.  Our interest is in the influence
institutional investors have on executive compensation, rather than an analysis of the
optimal managerial ownership dynamics.  Since any institutional investor influence,
whether direct or indirect, would presumably come through the board’s decisions,
current compensation measures are more appropriate for our tests.  The board has
much more limited control (e.g., through vesting and trading restrictions) over the
amount of stock and options executives choose to retain in their portfolios, control that
may be only partially effective as evidenced by the Ofek and Yermack (2000) and Bettis,
Bizjak, and Lemmon (1999) results.  The use of current compensation is further justified
by the Core and Guay (1998) study in which they differentiate between the stock and
flow of CEO equity incentives (options and shares of stocks).  They conclude that firms
use the flow, i.e., new grants of equity incentives, to reward past performance and to re-
optimize incentives for future performance.
II.B.  Measures of Institutional Influence
For every firm on the ExecuComp database, we obtain institutional equity holdings for
each year between December 1991 and December 1996 from the CDA Spectrum
database.  CDA Spectrum derives these holdings from institutional investors’ 13-f filings.
(Institutional investors with more than $100 million in equities must report their equity
ownership to the SEC in quarterly 13-f filings). Institutions file their holdings as the
aggregate for their firm, regardless of how many individual fund portfolios they have.
USAA mutual funds, for example, file one report even though they have over thirty
different mutual funds under management.
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We measure institutional investor influence in three ways.  We measure total
institutional ownership as the fraction of shares outstanding owned by institutions.  This
measure should primarily capture indirect institutional monitoring, although it may also
reflect some direct monitoring.  Our second measure of institutional investor influence,
the concentration of institutional ownership, is designed to capture the direct institutional
monitoring.  It is calculated as the proportion of the institutional investor ownership
accounted for by the top five institutional investors in the firm.
The third measure of institutional influence is designed to examine whether
certain types of institutional investors, such as those that would not be subject to
business pressures, are providing monitoring.  Specifically, we examine whether
investment companies and independent investment advisers are associated with better
apparent monitoring.
Besides the data on executive compensation and institutional investor ownership,
we also employ further information on each firm in our analyses.  Stock returns, stock-
return volatilities and dividend yields are obtained from the Center for Research in
Securities Prices (CRSP) and details on assets and liabilities are obtained from
Compustat.  To be included in the final sample, a firm must have data available from all
four sources for a given year.  This requirement results in a sample of 36,352 firm-
executive-year observations.
Descriptive statistics on the principal variables of interest are given in Table I.
Panel A provides information on firm characteristics and Panel B on institutional
holdings.  As can be seen from the table, the sample consists of a range of firms with an
average market capitalization of $3.5 billion, but a median of $869 million.  The average
total direct compensation is $1.25 million, where salary plus bonus averages $525,970.
Reflecting the high stock market returns during the 1990s sample period, the average
annual return is 21.8% and the average annual change in total shareholder wealth is
$571 million, although there were also firms that performed very poorly.  The tenth-
percentile return is a negative 23.1%.
15
Panel B shows that institutional investors have large interests in the sample firms
with average holdings of 53.1%.  In fact, the firm at the tenth percentile has institutional
holdings of 25.4%, indicating that our sample in general has substantial institutional
interest.  There is also significant concentration of institutional investors, the average
holdings of the top 5 institutional investors in a firm is 22% of the outstanding shares and
44% of the institutional holdings.  The breakdown of the institutional holdings into the
different types of institutions is also shown in Panel B of Table I. The classification into
institution type is not precise because institutions report their holdings in aggregate and
some institutions span more than one type.  For example, banks that own mutual fund
companies would combine the trust department and mutual fund holdings into one
report.  CDA Spectrum classifies an institution by the type that constitutes the majority of
their holdings, so these holdings would be reported as a bank if CDA Spectrum
estimates that more of its holdings are bank trust assets or an investment company
otherwise.  For the sample firms, on average, over the time period, 10% of the shares
outstanding are held by bank trust departments, 4.8% by insurance companies, 9.4% by
investment companies, 24.4% by independent investment advisers, and 4.5% by other
institutional investors.  Because our sample is limited to the 1990s due to the availability
of executive compensation data, Panel B shows larger percentage holdings by
investment companies and smaller percentage holdings by bank trust departments than
do other studies using the CDA database over a longer time frame.  Over the last few
decades, investment companies and independent investment advisers became relatively
more important and bank trust departments became relatively less important.
III.  Relation between institutional investor influence and executive compensation
In examining the relation between institutional ownership and executive compensation,
we need to control for confounding variables.  Previous research has found systematic
differences in institutional investment across characteristics of the firm such as size
(Sias and Starks (1997), Gompers and Metrick (1999)) and performance (Nofsinger and
Sias (1999)).  Similarly, there is evidence of a relation between managerial
16
compensation and these variables.  For example, Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988)
document that larger firms (in terms of net sales) have higher paid executives, although
Murphy (1998) shows that the explanatory power of firm sales has declined over time.
Smith and Watts (1992) have found systematic differences in managerial compensation
across size, performance and a firm’s growth opportunities (among other variables).
They hypothesize that because it is more difficult to observe managers’ actions in firms
with more growth options, those firms will be more likely to employ incentive plans.
Using recent data, Harvey and Shrieves (2000) also document a strong relation between
growth opportunities and the presence of incentive compensation.
Given the evidence of systematic differences across firm characteristics in
explaining executive compensation and institutional investor ownership, we control for
these characteristics in our regressions.  We employ several measures of firm size:
market capitalization, net sales and total assets.  Using Tobin’s q ratio, we control for the
presence of growth opportunities and to the extent that Tobin’s q captures expected
performance of the firm, we control for that as well.10  We use industry dummy variables
to not only control for pay similarities within industries, but also for similarities in
institutional investment (these can be thought of as fixed effects at the industry level).
Year dummy variables allow both changes in pay and pay-for-performance sensitivity to
vary year-by-year.  Finally, we employ a CEO dummy variable, equal to one if the
executive is the CEO and zero otherwise, to determine if there are differences in the
effects of pay-for-performance sensitivity for CEOs versus the other top executives of
the firm.11  One would expect a variation in compensation structure because of the
differences in ultimate responsibility for the two groups.
                                               
10 Tobin’s q is calculated using Compustat data as (the market value of equity less book value of
equity plus book value of assets) divided by book value of assets.
11 In some cases, ExecuComp does not designate which of the executives is the CEO.  In this
case, we assume the executive with the highest base salary is the CEO.
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III.A.  Direct institutional investor influence and the level of executive compensation
The first model we test is the relation between the level of executive compensation and
the concentration of institutional ownership:
(1) Level of manager’s compensationit = β1∆(shareholder wealth)it + β2 ∆(shareholder
wealth)it-1 + β3 (concentration of top 5 institutionsit-1) + Σβk (control variablesit),
where the level of compensation is measured by either salary or by total direct
compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, option and stock grants, long-term incentive
plan payouts, and other compensation), the control variables are Tobin’s q ratio, market
capitalization, a dummy variable equal to one for each firm's CEO, industry-level dummy
variables equal to one for the two-digit SIC in which the firm operates, and year
dummies equal to one if the observation is for the given year.  We use the concentration
of institutional ownership for the prior period in order to control for any changes in
institutional ownership that may be related to the year’s performance and subsequent
higher pay for the executives.  Tobin’s q ratio, market capitalization, net sales, and total
assets are similarly lagged.  The results of the regressions are provided in Table II.
The models in Table II show that the level of the top executives’ salaries (in
Model (1)) and total direct compensation (in Model (2)) are significantly negatively
related to institutional ownership concentration. This negative relation is consistent with
institutions acting as a check on the level of executive pay.  Where ownership is more
concentrated, institutions should have an easier time coordinating their efforts and thus
more easily exert pressure on management, ensuring that management does not
expropriate rents from shareholders in the form of excess compensation.  In particular,
this result suggests that institutions do monitor managers.
 These results hold even after controlling for the firm’s growth options and
performance (through Tobin’s q), the firm’s size and industry, the year of the
observation, and whether the executive is the CEO or one of the other top executives in
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the firm.12  The level of the managerial compensation is also related to the current and
previous years’ changes in shareholder wealth.  As found in previous studies of
executive compensation, larger firms pay greater compensation and CEOs receive
significantly greater compensation than the rest of the top executive team.  The negative
relation between level of compensation and Tobin’s q suggests that firms with growth
opportunities pay less current compensation, possibly because the CEO can expect to
receive more in the future due to the expected growth.  The coefficients on the CEO
dummy indicate that CEOs tend to earn about $1.5 million more in total direct
compensation than do the other members of the executive team.
To further examine the robustness of our results to our specifications, we
estimated the models using only CEOs, rather than the full management team.  The
results were basically unchanged.13  We again found that CEO compensation is
decreasing in institutional ownership concentration.  In addition, given that institutions
tend to invest primarily in the largest firms (Gompers and Metrick (1999)), and given the
broad coverage of the ExecuComp database, we used a variety of alternative controls
for the size of the firm.  Our results are robust to the inclusion of net sales and total
assets as additional size proxies, as well as the square of market capitalization as a
control for possible nonlinearities in the data.  The results are qualitatively very similar if
we estimate the regressions using the natural logarithm of compensation (salary or total
direct pay) as the dependent variable.  (These alternative specifications are not reported
for the sake of brevity.)
III.B.  Direct institutional investor influence and pay-for-performance sensitivity
In this section, we examine the relation between direct institutional investor influence
and the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation.  We examine this
relation using tests based on the following equation:
                                               
12 The results are nearly identical whether we employ four-digit or two-digit SIC codes for
classifying a firm into an industry.
13 This specification also potentially benefits the accuracy of the estimated standard errors by
using only one observation per firm per year.  Thus, our results are not being driven by incorrect
standard errors due to correlation within a given firm-year.
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(2)      ∆(manager’s compensation)it = β1∆(shareholder wealth)it-1
+ ∆(shareholder wealth)it*[β2 (% owned by institutionsit-1) +
β3(concentration of top 5 institutionsit-1) + Σβk (control variablesit)] +
Σβy year dummy variablest,
where the managerial compensation is measured by either salary plus bonus or by total
direct compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, option and stock grants, long-term
incentive plan payouts, and other compensation) and the control variables are Tobin’s q
ratio, market capitalization, net sales, total assets, a dummy variable equal to one for
each firm's CEO, industry-level dummy variables equal to one for the two-digit SIC in
which the firm operates, and year dummies equal to one if the observation was for the
given year.14  We have also included a variable to measure indirect institutional
influence, the aggregate ownership of institutions.  We discuss the results on this
variable in the next section.
The first two columns of Table III provide the regression results when the
manager’s compensation is defined as salary plus bonus.  The two models use different
specifications to control for size effects.  In the first model, market capitalization is
employed alone.  In the second model, because the relevant size variable to control for
differences in compensation is not clear, we include all three size control variables:
market capitalization, net sales and total assets.
The results in Table III show that regardless of the specification for size, the
concentration of institutional ownership is significantly positively related to a firm’s pay-
for-performance sensitivity.  As the regression results show, pay-for-performance
sensitivity is affected by institutional ownership concentration, even after controlling for
growth opportunities, size, industry fixed effects, and whether the executive is CEO.  The
more concentrated is institutional ownership, the greater the pay-for-performance
sensitivity of top management’s salary and bonus compensation.  These results are
                                               
14 The year dummies enter the regression twice: once as intercept terms, and once interacted
with the change in shareholder wealth.  Thus, they control for time-specific variation in both
changes in pay, and changes in pay-for-performance sensitivity.  Hall and Liebman (1998) show
that pay-for-performance sensitivity has increased since the 1980s.
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consistent with Black’s (1992) argument that institutions should take on a stronger
monitoring role by holding larger stakes in companies and teaming up with other
institutional investors to have more influence.  The hypothesis of greater institutional
monitoring leading to better CEO compensation structures is also consistent with the
results of research that finds a relation between CEO compensation and the firm’s board
or ownership structure.  For example, Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find that
cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation can be partially explained by measures
of board and ownership structure.
The regressions also show that pay-for-performance sensitivity is stronger for the
CEO than for the other top managers of the firm.  Pay-for-performance sensitivity is
negatively related to size, consistent with previous studies that have found smaller firms
pay more incentive pay than do larger firms (e.g., Murphy (1998)).
Columns three, four, and five of Table III expand the definition of managerial
compensation to include other forms of compensation besides the cash compensation
from salary and bonus payments.  The measure also includes stock and option grants
for the year, long-term incentive compensation and any other compensation.  Model (3)
provides the results using only market capitalization as the control for size.  Model (4)
shows that the results are basically invariant when other measures for firm size are
included as well.15  Finally, Model (5) controls for firm-level fixed effects and again shows
that the results are comparable no matter which specification is employed.  The
consistency in results across Models (4) and (5) implies that our results are not driven by
cross-sectional variation across firms alone, or by unobservable firm-specific variables.
Even within a given firm, ownership concentration is positively related to pay-for-
performance sensitivity.  Put another way, our findings are not being driven by certain
“types” of firms (subject to firm types remaining constant over our sample period).
When we expand the measure of compensation to total direct compensation, we
once again find that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is positively related to
                                               
15 As with the results for the level of pay, our results for pay-for-performance sensitivity are robust
to various controls for a nonlinear size effect, such as the inclusion of the square of market
capitalization as a determinant of sensitivity.
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institutional ownership concentration.  The result that performance sensitivity of the
executive compensation is significantly positively related to institutional ownership
concentration is consistent with the hypothesis that institutional influence is a
complementary monitoring mechanism to incentive compensation. This result is
consistent with the Chidambaran and John (1999) theoretical argument on the
complementarity of institutional investor ownership and managerial compensation.
Furthermore, the significantly positive coefficient on the concentration of institutional
ownership variable suggests that institutional investors have a direct monitoring effect as
reported in the anecdotal press accounts and Useem (1996).
While economic significance is certainly in the eye of the beholder, the effects of
institutional investor influence are relatively large compared to the average pay-for-
performance sensitivity in our sample.  While CEOs’ pay-for-performance sensitivity of
salary plus bonus averages $0.032 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth, the
estimates from Model (2) imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in institutional
ownership concentration is associated with a $0.005 increase in sensitivity, an increase
of 16%.  Similarly, CEOs’ pay-for-performance sensitivity of total direct compensation
averages $0.18 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth, and a one-standard-deviation
increase in institutional ownership concentration implies a $0.040 increase in sensitivity
(using Model (4)).
III.C.  Indirect institutional investor influence and pay-for-performance sensitivity
As discussed previously, the institutional investor monitoring may also result indirectly
from the institutions’ preferences and trading.  We measure the indirect influence by the
total percentage institutional ownership.  As shown in Table III, regardless of the model
specification, pay-for-performance sensitivity is positively related to the level of total
institutional ownership.  In terms of economic significance, the estimates from Model 4
imply that a one standard deviation increase in total institutional ownership is associated
with a $0.037 increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity, an increase in sensitivity of
22%.
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While this is of comparable magnitude to the effect of concentration, it should be
noted that our proxy for the indirect effect, the total percentage institutional ownership,
might be partially measuring the direct influence.  A large institutional presence (in levels
but not concentration) could also be associated with increased direct pressure on the
firm.  Thus, one can think of this measure as an upper bound on the magnitude of the
indirect effect.  We use total ownership as our proxy for the indirect effect because
actions taken by firms to attract institutions should affect the total ownership, but not its
concentration.  In fact, if we test for this possibility by regressing the change in
ownership concentration on time t-1 pay-for-performance sensitivity, we find no
significant relation (results not reported).16
III.D.  Institutional investor influence and option-grant sensitivity
Stock-option grants have become an increasingly important component of executive
pay.  In fact, Murphy (1998) states that in the 1990s, stock options have replaced base
salaries as the single largest component of compensation.  Because a firm’s option
grants are a particular form of specific pay-for-performance, we analyze the option-grant
pay-for-performance sensitivity separately from that of other types of compensation.
Analyzing the option grants independently is also important because of the increasing
interest by institutional investors in firms’ option compensation.  Another advantage of
this approach is that it uses an ex ante measure of pay sensitivity compared to the ex
post nature of the regressions above.  Option-grant sensitivity can be directly calculated
using observed option-grant data and is not subject to the noise inherent in using slope
coefficients as sensitivity estimates.
We conduct a Tobit analysis of the pay-for-performance sensitivity of option
grants as a function of institutional investor ownership because many firms still do not
pay their managers with stock options and even those firms that do use options, do not
necessarily grant them every year.  To calculate the option-grant sensitivity, we use the
                                               
16 For this reverse regression, we use option-grant sensitivity as the independent variable
because our other measure of sensitivity is estimated using slope coefficients, and not directly
observable.
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methodology suggested by Yermack (1995).   First, we calculate the delta of each option
grant, ∂C/∂P (where C is the value of the call option and P is the price of the stock), by
using the Black-Scholes model modified for dividends.  We derive dividend yields and
volatilities from the CRSP data.  We then multiply the delta of each option grant by the
number of options granted and divide by the number of shares outstanding at the
beginning of the year.  Since this number is the sensitivity of the option grant per dollar
change in share value, we then multiply it by 1,000, which gives the familiar dollar
change in managerial wealth per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth.  For years in
which executives receive multiple option grants, the sensitivities are aggregated across
each year for each manager.  We find that the average option-grant sensitivity for this
sample is $0.9665 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth, with a median of $0.1711
and a standard deviation of $3.144.  While these are much higher than Yermack's mean
and median of $0.59 and $0.07, the difference is consistent with the increasing role of
options in compensation over the 1990s.17
The option-grant sensitivity is the dependent variable in the Tobit regressions
whose results are shown in Table IV.  Consistent with Table III, we find that both the
total percentage holdings of institutional investors and the concentration of the top five
institutions are important in explaining option-grant pay-for-performance sensitivity.
These results further suggest that institutional investors are a complimentary monitoring
device and the positive coefficient on the concentration variable implies that the
institutions provide a direct influence on the structure of executive compensation.
Table IV additionally shows that the option grant pay-for-performance sensitivity
is positively related to Tobin’s q ratio and highly significant.  This result is consistent with
the hypothesis and evidence of Smith and Watts (1992) regarding firms with greater
growth opportunities.  They argue that such firms should have more incentive pay and in
support of this argument they find that industries with higher average Tobin’s q ratios
have greater proportions of firms with option plans.  However, inconsistent with our
                                               
17 Yermack's sample ends in 1991.
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results and those of Smith and Watts (1992), Yermack (1995) finds a significantly
negative relation between CEO option-grant sensitivity and Tobin’s q ratio.
One concern about our results is the possibility that recent increasing trends for
both institutional ownership and option compensation are driving the results. To examine
this possibility, we conducted two additional tests.  First, we ran a regression to see if
lagged sensitivity of option grants would predict subsequent institutional ownership.  The
results were insignificant.  Second, we repeated our analysis in Table IV on a per-year
basis (results not reported).  For four out of the five annual cross-sectional regressions,
we find that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the option grants is related to the level
of institutional ownership and the concentration of that ownership, indicating that our
results are not driven by common trends.  These results are also consistent with the
hypothesis that the institutional influence is direct rather than indirect.  In addition, we
estimated a random effects panel Tobit model (with effects at the firm level) to check the
robustness of the model specification.  There was no substantial change in results.
Thus, as in Table III, our results in Table IV do not appear to be driven by unobservable
firm heterogeneity.18
III.E.  Type of institutional investor and institutional investor influence
Institutional investors vary in terms of their incentives, regulatory and competitive
environments and clienteles.  All of these factors may affect the degree to which a given
institution will purchase and monitor a corporation.19  As already noted, Brickley, Lease
and Smith (1988) point out differences in the pressure-sensitivity of institutional
shareholders due to business relations with the company.  Murphy and Van Nuys (1994)
discuss the conflicting incentives for activist public institutions.  Because some types of
                                               
18 We employed random effects here rather than fixed effects due to the use of maximum
likelihood in estimating the model.
19 See Del Guercio (1996), Falkenstein (1996), and Bennett, Sias and Starks (2000) for research
on the relation between type of institutional investor and the institutions’ preferences for certain
stock characteristics.  See Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2000) for research on the
effects of constraints on portfolio manager decisions.
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institutions are more likely to use their influence than other types, in this section we
examine the institutional ownership concentration by type of institution.
Following the Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) definition of which institutions
would be pressure-insensitive, we separate out these institutions from our institutional
concentration variable.  The pressure-insensitive concentration measure is then the sum
of the shares owned by the top-5 institutions that are either investment companies or
independent investment advisers.  The other institutions (insurance companies, banks
and other) are then included in the pressure-sensitive concentration measure.
To determine whether certain types of institutional investors appear to have more
influence than do others, as in equation (1), we regress the level of compensation on
these two separate measures of institutional concentration.  The results of this
regression are provided in Table V.  Compensation is measured by salary in Model (1)
and by total direct compensation in Model (2).
Increased concentration by both pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive
institutional investors is associated with lower levels of salary and total direct
compensation.  Further, a Wald F-statistic rejects the null hypothesis of equality for the
coefficients of the two types of institutional investors, showing that the pressure-
insensitive institutional investor concentration is more negatively associated with salary.
In Table VI, we repeat the analyses of Table III (the relation between pay-for-
performance sensitivity and institutional influence), where once again, we substitute the
pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive concentration measures for the previously
aggregated concentration measure.   Model (1) shows the relation using salary plus
bonus and Model (2) shows the relation using total direct compensation.  In both cases,
we find substantial variation in the relation between the pay-for-performance sensitivity
of the executives’ compensation and institutional concentration across the different types
of institutions.  For the pay-for-performance sensitivity of salary plus bonus and total
direct compensation, the pressure-insensitive institutional concentration has a significant
positive relation, while the pressure-sensitive institutional concentration has no
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significant relation.  These results suggest that some types of institutions have a
stronger association with incentive compensation.20
The results of Tables V and VI imply that investment companies and independent
investment advisers play more of a monitoring role than do other types of institutions.
They are consistent with the Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) hypothesis that these
institutions are more pressure-insensitive than other types.  That is, because investment
companies and independent investment advisers in general are less likely to be
concerned about their future business relations with a given firm, they are more likely to
put pressure on that firm to mitigate shareholder-manager agency conflicts.  Thus, those
firms are likely to have less excessive compensation and more incentive compensation.
IV. Conclusions
We find a strong relation between a firm’s executive compensation structure and its
institutional influence.  We find that the level of managerial compensation is negatively
related to the concentration of that ownership, suggesting that institutional investors
serve a direct monitoring role in mitigating shareholder-manager agency conflicts.  Using
various measures of pay-for-performance sensitivity, we find that the performance-
sensitivity of the executive compensation is positively related to aggregate institutional
ownership and the concentration of that ownership.  These results imply that the
presence of institutional investors as owners is related to the adoption of compensation
schedules with more pay-for-performance sensitivity, suggesting that institutional
investors contribute to corporate governance of the firm, both directly through their
intervention and indirectly through their preferences.  Given the strong positive relation
between institutional influence and pay-for-performance sensitivity, we conclude that the
institutional influence is a complementary monitoring mechanism to incentive
compensation in mitigating the shareholder-manager agency problem.
                                               
20 We find the same differences between the two types of institutional investors when we use the
option-grant sensitivity.
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Furthermore, we find that institutions which are less likely to be sensitive to
pressure from management have the strongest association with executive pay.  Our
results are consistent whether we use ex post measures of pay-for-performance
sensitivity, such as slope estimates from regressions, or ex ante measures, such as
option-grant sensitivity.
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Table I
Summary Statistics
This table shows the sample statistics for the principal variables.  Panel A shows the firm characteristics
over the 1992-1997 time period and Panel B shows the institutional investor holdings over the 1991-
1996 time period (in the empirical tests, institutional holdings are lagged by one year).  Market
capitalization is the number of shares outstanding times the price at the beginning of the year.  Cash
compensation is the manager’s salary plus bonus for the year.  Total direct compensation is the sum of
the manager’s salary, bonus, stock and option grants, and other compensation.  ∆(Shareholder wealtht)
is defined as the change in value of the shares outstanding times stock price from period t-1 to period t.
Institutional holdings are calculated as the shares held by institutional investors who file 13-f reports
divided by the total number of shares outstanding except for the variable that shows the top 5
institutional holdings as a percentage of total institutional holdings.
Panel A. Firm Characteristics      
   Standard   
Variable Mean Median Deviation 10% 90%
Market capitalization ($MM) 3,476.93 869.91 9,477.30 155.78 7,469.07
Cash compensation (Salary + bonus, $K) 525.97 361.85 813.66 155.17 1,000.00
Total direct compensation ($K) 1,250.16 645.03 2,910.64 215.97 2,540.77
Return 21.8% 15.7% 49.3% -23.1% 69.2%
∆(Shareholder wealth) ($MM) 570.74 99.11 2,762.85 -186.32 1,363.37
Panel B. Institutional Investor Holdings     
Standard
Variable Mean Median Deviation 10% 90%
Holdings as a % of shares outstanding:
Total institutional holdings  53.1% 54.8% 19.4% 25.4% 77.3%
Holdings of top 5 institutions 22.3 21.5 9.7 10.6 34.3
Holdings of top 5 institutions
(as % of institutional holdings) 44.0 42.1 14.6 26.5 64.4
Bank trust departments 10.0 8.7 6.7 2.9 18.5
Insurance companies 4.8 3.9 4.3 .9 9.2
Investment companies 9.4 7.7 7.5 1.4 19.8
Independent investment advisers 24.4 23.5 11.9 9.4 40.6
Other institutional investors 4.5 3.7 4.4 .6 9.0
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Table II
Level of Executive Compensation as a Function of Institutional Influence
Dependent variables:  Salary or Total Direct Compensation
This table shows the coefficients from a regression of the manager’s compensation against the change and
lagged change in shareholder’s wealth, holdings of top 5 institutions as a percent of institutional holdings
and controls for firm size (Market capitalization, net sales, total assets) and Tobin’s q ratio. Further control
variables are a CEO dummy that equals one if the executive is CEO and 0 otherwise and a series of control
dummies for the firm’s two-digit SIC industry and for time.  (The coefficients for the latter variables are not
shown in the table.)   T-statistics are provided in parentheses.  One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Salaryt
Total Direct
Compensationt
Independent Variable (1) (2)
∆(Shareholder wealtht) 0.001 0.058***
(1.43) (10.14)
∆(Shareholder wealtht-1) -0.005*** 0.040***
(-10.30) (4.80)
Top 5 /Total Institutional Ownershipt-1 -304.441*** -2,189.257***
(-48.99) (-22.64)
Tobin's qt-1 -20.430*** -58.163***
(-29.28) (-5.37)
Market Capitalizationt-1 0.008*** 0.045***
(47.12) (16.75)
CEO Dummyt                  268.190***               1,500.970***
(126.60) (46.62)
Number of observations                  36,346                  33,278
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.18
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Table III
Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity as a Function of Institutional Influence
Dependent variables: ∆(Salary Plus Bonus) or ∆(Total Direct Compensation)
This table shows the coefficients from a regression of the change in the manager’s compensation against the lagged change in shareholder’s wealth and
the change in shareholder’s wealth interacted with percentage holdings of institutions filing 13-f reports, holdings of top 5 institutions as a percent of
institutional holdings and controls for firm size (Market capitalization, net sales, total assets) and Tobin’s q ratio. Further control variables are a CEO
dummy that equals one if the executive is CEO and 0 otherwise and a series of control dummies for the firm’s two-digit SIC industry and for time.  (The
coefficients for the latter variables are not shown in the table.)  Models (1) and (2) have ∆(Salary plus bonus) as the dependent variable and Models (3)
(4), and (5) have ∆(Total Direct Compensation) as the dependent variable.  Model (5) is with firm fixed effects.  T-statistics are provided in parentheses.
One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:                                                           ∆ (Salary + Bonust)                                              ∆ (Total Direct Compensationt)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆(Shareholder wealtht-1) 0.001 0.001 0.091*** 0.094*** 0.079***
(0.51) (0.52) (9.02) (9.24) (6.14)
∆(Shareholder wealtht) X
Total Institutional Ownershipt-1 0.050*** 0.065*** 0.095* 0.193*** 0.404***
(4.00) (4.86) (1.72) (3.27) (4.72)
Top 5 /Total Instl. Ownershipt-1 0.035** 0.036** 0.246*** 0.273*** 0.243**
(2.18) (2.18) (3.41) (3.71) (2.48)
Tobin's qt-1 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002 -0.001 0.008
(-3.84) (-3.87) (-0.51) (-0.24) (1.63)
Market Capitalizationt-1 -0.172*** -0.087 -1.387*** -1.392*** -0.781
(-4.14) (-1.22) (-7.54) (-4.50) (-2.97)***
Net Salest-1 0.213*** 0.002***
(2.04) (4.49)
Total Assetst-1 -0.118** -0.001***
(3.21) (-3.83)
CEO Dummyt 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.085***
(8.12) (8.10) (7.42) (7.42) (7.45)
Number of observations 36,346 36,307 27,612 27,592 27,612
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03
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Table IV
Tobit Analysis of Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity of Option Grants
as a Function of Institutional Ownership
Dependent variable:  ∆ in Value of Options Granted per $1,000 ∆ in Shareholder Wealth
This table shows the coefficients from a regression of the change in the value of options granted a manager
per a $1000 change in shareholder wealth against the lagged change and change in shareholder’s wealth,
and percentage holdings of institutions filing 13-f reports (in total and divided by type of institution), holdings
of top 5 institutions as a percent of institutional holdings and controls for firm size (Market capitalization, net
sales, total assets) and Tobin’s q ratio. Further control variables are a CEO dummy that equals one if the
executive is CEO and 0 otherwise and a series of control dummies for the firm’s two-digit SIC industry and
for time.  (The coefficients for the latter variables are not shown in the table.)  T-statistics are provided in
parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively.
Independent Variable (1) (2)
∆(Shareholder wealtht) 7.450 6.810
(0.85) (0.77)
∆(Shareholder wealtht-1) 0.611 3.520
(0.05) (0.27)
Total Institutional Ownershipt-1 0.822*** 0.798***
(6.59) (6.39)
Top 5 /Total Institutional Ownershipt-1 1.338*** 1.357***
(8.16) (8.28)
Tobin's qt-1 0.066*** 0.072***
(3.93) (4.23)
Market Capitalizationt-1 -10.400*** -15.900***
(-2.53) (-3.09)
Net Salest-1 3.090
(0.79)
Total Assetst-1 2.152
(1.64)
CEO Dummyt 1.388*** 1.385***
(28.54) (28.48)
Number of observations 33,398 33,364
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Table V
Level of Executive Compensation as a Function of Institutional Influence
Divided by Type of Institution
Dependent variables:  Salary or Total Direct Compensation
This table shows the coefficients from a regression of the manager’s compensation against the
change and lagged change in shareholder’s wealth, holdings of top 5 institutions as a percent of
institutional holdings (divided by type of institution) and controls for firm size (Market capitalization,
net sales, total assets) and Tobin’s q ratio. Further control variables are a CEO dummy that equals
one if the executive is CEO and 0 otherwise and a series of control dummies for the firm’s two-digit
SIC industry and for time.  (The coefficients for the latter variables are not shown in the table.)   T-
statistics are provided in parentheses.  One, two, and three asterisks denote significance at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Salaryt
Total Direct
Compensationt
Independent Variable (1) (2)
∆(Shareholder wealtht) 0.001 0.058***
(1.44) (10.13)
∆(Shareholder wealtht-1) -0.005*** 0.039***
(-10.10) (4.75)
Pressure-Sensitive Concentrationt-1 -277.838*** -2,277.654***
(-35.85) (-18.98)
Pressure-Insensitive Concentrationt-1 -320.466*** -2,133.827**
(-47.06) (-20.04)
Tobin's qt-1 -20.108*** -59.200***
(-28.74) (-5.45)
Market Capitalizationt-1 0.008*** 0.045***
(46.44) (16.80)
CEO Dummyt 268.23***                1,500.79 ***
(126.67) (46.62)
Number of observations 36,346                  33,278
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.18
Wald F-statistic for equality of coefficients for 32.97*** 1.55
     Pressure-Sensitive versus Pressure-Insensitive (0.00) (0.21)
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Table VI
Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity as a Function of Institutional Influence
Divided by Type of Institution
Dependent variables: ∆(Salary Plus Bonus) or ∆(Total Direct Compensation)
This table shows the coefficients from a regression of the change in the manager’s compensation
against the lagged change in shareholder’s wealth and the change in shareholder’s wealth
interacted with percentage holdings of institutions filing 13-f reports, holdings of top 5 institutions as
a percent of institutional holdings (divided by type of institution) and controls for firm size (Market
capitalization, net sales, total assets) and Tobin’s q ratio. Further control variables are a CEO
dummy that equals one if the executive is CEO and 0 otherwise and a series of control dummies for
the firm’s two-digit SIC industry and for time.  (The coefficients for the latter variables are not shown
in the table.)  T-statistics are provided in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denote
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:
∆ (Salary +
Bonust)
∆(Total Direct
Compensationt)
Independent Variable (1) (2)
∆(Shareholder wealtht-1) 0.0003 0.084
(0.14) (8.24)
∆(Shareholder wealtht) X
     Totalt-1 0.055*** 0.145***
(4.40) (2.60)
     Pressure-Sensitive Concentrationt-1 0.001 -0.010
(0.04) (-0.12)
     Pressure-Insensitive Concentrationt-1 0.078*** 0.576***
(3.88) (6.40)
     Tobin's qt-1 -0.003*** -0.003
(-4.05) (-0.92)
     Market Capt-1 -0.142*** -1.150***
(-3.35) (-6.13)
     CEO Dummyt 0.023*** 0.083***
(8.07) (7.34)
Number of observations                 36,346 27,612
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.04
Wald F-statistic for equality of coefficients for 12.97*** 36.81***
     Pressure-Sensitive versus Pressure-Insensitive (0.00) (0.00)
